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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1667 
EARL H. HANN, AN INFANT WHO SUES BY SARAH 
A. HANN, HIS NEXT F·RIEND, 
versus 
TIMES-DISPATCH PTTBLISHING COMPANY,, INCOR-
PORAT.ED AND RAYMOND BART·LAM. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: I 
Your undersigned petiti,.oner, Earl H. Hann, an infant who 
sues by Sarah A. Hann, his next friendJ respectfully shows 
unto Your Honors that he is aggrieved biv a judgment of the 
Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, sus-
taiiling a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court, 
filed by the Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorpo-
rated, which said judgment was entered on the 3oth day of 
November, 1934 (M. R., p. 15). 
In. this action damages were asked by the plaintiff for in-
juries sustained while riding in an automobile operated by 
an agent of the defendant, Times-Dispatch Publishing Com-
pany, Incorporated. Said defendant, in its plea, set up that 
the plaintiff was its employee and that the injury was by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, 
bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
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Commission of Virginia. To this plea the plaintiff replied 
generally, and on an agreed statement of facts the issue was 
submitted to the court. The court sustained the plea of th~ 
defendant and the plaintiff brings this petition. 
Counsel for the plaintiff desires to state orally to the Court 
the reasons for reviewing the decision complained of. ·· -· 
·A transcript of the record, duly certified, accompanies this 
petition, and is made a part hereof. 
Your petitioner adopts this petition as his original brief, 
and delivered a copy in person to Benjamin R. Bruner, Esq., 
. of. counsel for the defendant, on the 30th day of April, 1935. 
THE FACTS. 
By agreement, the plaintiff went each morning, by a means 
of his own selection, to a sub-station of the defendant com-
pany, where he received papers for delivery on an agreed 
route. These papers were charged to the plaintiff and paid 
for at the end of each 'veek. The plaintiff delivered the pa-
pers and at the end of each weelr collected for them. If he 
failed to collect from a customer, the loss was borne by the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff was required to get his papers at 5:30 
A. M. On the morning in question he did not reach the sub-
station at 5:30 A. NL and the supervisor for the defendant 
company went to the home of the plaintiff and took him in 
the supervisor's car and started for the sub-station. At 5 :45 
A. M., while on the way to the sub-station, the accident hap-
pened in which the plaintiff was injured. No transportation 
was promised the plaintiff in the contract of employment 
and none had been previously furnished him. All of the facts 
are set out in an agreed statement made a part of the record 
(M. R., p. 19). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The Co·u1·t erred in su.c;taining the plea to the ju.risdictinn 
of the Court, {1/J'ld in holding that it had no .iurisdiction over 
t~~e subject matter arisin,q upon the plaintiff's Notice of M o-
t1on for Judgrnent. 
There are two questions, the determination of which are· 
necessary in order to decide whether this case should be 
heard by the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond,. 
Part Two, or. the Industrial Commission of Virginia. These 
questions are: · 
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1. lV as the plaintiff an emplOJJee of the defendant company? 
2. If he was an employee, was his inj'ltry "an injury by ac-
cident arising out of a.nd in the course of the e1nploy·ment"? 
FIRST. 
Was the plaintiff an e1nployee of the defendant company? 
The elements o:£ the relation of employee and employer do 
not exist in this case. They are: 
1. Power of control. 
2. Right of supervision. 
3. Right to discharge. 
4. There 1nust be a contract of hire. 
5. Payment of 'vages. 
The re1ationship of employer and employee. is the same as 
tl1at of master and servant. A. C. L. R. Co. v. Tredway, 120 
V a. 735, 93 S. E. 562. ''A servant, strictly speaking, is a 
person who, by contract or operation of law, is for a limited 
period subject to the control of another in a particular trade, 
business, or occupation." Wood's ~laster & Servant, Sec. 
1, cited in Ginter v. Shelton, 102 Va. 185, 45 S. E. 892. ''A 
servant is one who is employed to render personal service 
to his employer, otherwise than in the pursuit of an inde-
pendent calling·, and who in such service remains entirely 
under the control and direction of the latter, who is called 
his master." 1\feachem on Agency, cited in Merriman Co. v. 
Thomas & Co., 103 Va. 24, 48 S. E. 490. 
1. Power of Control. 
Under the agreed statement of facts (M. R., p. 19) it ap-
pears that the defendant company employed a ''supervisor 
of carriers". He made the agreements with the boys for 
the delivery of papers, was present at the sub-station each 
n1orning to see that the papers were properly distributed 
· to the carrier boys and saw that each route was served. There 
is nothing in the agreed statement of fact to show that the 
~lefendant company exercised, or had the rig-ht to exercise any 
control over the actions of the carriers after they received 
the papers. The means and methods of making the delivery 
were left to the carriers. In a simlar case from California, 
the court said: 
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"Reverting to the situation presented by the facts in the 
instant case, as well as to such other facts as are common 
knowledge it becomes patent that, as to many of the details 
connected with the sale of newspapers by newsboys on the-
streets of the city of Los Angeles, it would approach· an ab-
swrdity to contend that the publisher of any 1~ewspaper could 
possibly exe1·cise cotnplete co·ntrol as to details." N. Y. In-
demnity Co. v. Industria-l Accident Co·mmission, 2R7 Pac. 368, 
holding· newsboy not employee. 
• Mechem as cited above says that an employee must be ''en-
tirely under the control'' of the employer to give rise to the 
relationship of employer and employee. The California case 
cited above holds that such control of a newsboy is impos-
sible. Such control as was exercised in the case at bar was 
control of the result and not of the means and methods of 
obtaining the result. l\Iere control of the result does not give 
rise to the relation of employer and employee, but instead, 
indicates that the relation is that of an independent contrac-
tor. In the case of Gall v. Detroit Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405, 
158 N. W. 36, 19 A. L. R. 1165, the court said: 
'' Rebtoy did have a contract for a specific piece of work; 
that is, for the delivery of the papers. And it was none the 
less specific because the places to which the deliveries were 
to be made, and the persons to whom the papers were to be 
delivered, might change from day to day. The right on the 
part of the con~pany to designate the persons and places was 
b~tt a right to designate the result to be obtained, and did 
not give the company any control over the method for ob-
taining that result." Held that the relation was that of in-
dependent contractor. 
In the case of Oklahoma Publishing Cornpa;ny v. Greenlee, 
150 Okla. 69, 300 Pac. 684, there was a similar holding, that 
the newsboy was an independent contractor. Fixing the 
price at which the papers must be sold did not constitute con-
tro~. Birminghan~ Post Co. v. St'ltr,qeon (Ala.), 149 So. 75, 
wh1ch says : · 
''The fact that a minimum p1·ice for the sale of the papers 
was fixed and li'inited terdtnrJJ prescribed did not tend to S'lltp-
ply the element of control essential for the relationship of 
employer and employee.'' Held to be relation of independent 
contractor. 
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In discussing control of a newsboy, in the case of State 
Compensation Insu.rance Fu.nd v. Industr-ial Accident CMn-
mission (Cal.), 14 Pac. 2nd, 306, the court said: 
''The purpose of these regulations prescribed by the com-
pany was to insure a certain and definite result-the prompt 
and regular distribution of its publication to all persons in 
the several routes who mig·ht be secured as subscribers of 
said publication. The means by which this result was to 
be accomplished was left entirely to the route owner, or car-
rier, in each route. * * *When we take into co·nsideration the 
limited control which the Examiner Printing Company ex-
ercised over Throndson, with the further fact that the Ex-
aminer Printing Company paid Throndson no wages or sal-
ary, but simply sold him papers which the latter was to re-
sell, we are forced to the conclusion that the relation of em-
ployer and en1ployee did not exist between the Examiner 
Printing· Company and Throndson, but on the other hand, 
Throndson, either as a sales agent, or, we think more prop-
erly, as an independent contractor, was performing the serv-
ice of delivering papers in said route 45." 
2. Supervision. 
The defendant company employed Bartlam as district su-
pervisor of carriers. His duties, as set out in the agreed 
statement of fact 'vere to see that the boys got their papers 
and started out on their routes. It has been held in this 
state that the reservation of the employer of the privilege of 
inspecting a:nd supervising the work of the contractor does 
not destroy or impair his character as an independent con-
tractor. Bibb v. N. & W. R. R., 87 Va. 711, 14 S. E. 163, and 
Boyd v. lJtahone, 142 Va. 690, 128 S. E. 259. 
01·eswell v. Oharlotte News Pu,blishing Company (N. C.), 
168 S. E. 408, is a case simlar to the one at bar. In that case 
the court said: '' Wl1ile there was certain supervision ex-
ercised by the agent of the defendant with respect to the ter-
l'itory assig-ned, the control over the methods of selling was 
too uncertain, indefinite, and remote to constitute the rela-
tionship of employer and employee.'' 
In the case of N. Y. Indemnity- Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Oom.mission, supra, the newsboy also obtained his papers from 
a ''district manager'', but notwithstanding tl1a t fact the court 
held the newsboy to be an independent contractor. 
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3. Right to D'ischarge. 
The power to disGharge a servant is one of the evidences. 
of the relation of master and servant. Emmerson v. Fay, 94 
Va. 60, 26 S. E. 386. The Times-Dispatch Publishing Com-
pany did not have the right to discharge Hann in accordance 
'vith the usually accepted use of that word. The co1npany 
could at most, only ref'use to sell Hann any more papers. 
''The right to discharge in fact amounted only to a refusal 
to extend further credit and furnish· papers.'' Binning ham, 
etc., v. Sturgeon, supra. In N. Y. Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident C otnmission (Cal.), 287 Pac. 368, the court 
said: 
''The presence in the instant case of the power of dis-
missal, if discernible, is so negligible· and so uncertain that 
it cannot be adopted as a controlling or deciding feature i'n 
determining-· the relationship which existed between the in-
terested parties. For any violation of any material condi-
tion under which the newsboy was to operate, his discharge 
as an employee apparently never was thought of or contem-
plated. Like any other 'sales agent', notably that of an au-
tomobile, who disregarded his covenant in that he sold his 
merchandise at a price less than that authorized by its pro-
ducer, or who operated in a territory other than that to 'vhich 
he had been assigned, he was punishable by not being there-
after permitted to purchase his wares from the producer or 
publisher. As it would seem clear that by no stretch of the 
sugg·ested rule could a 'sales agent' of an automobile be re-
garded as an employee of the manufacturer thereof, and, 
hence, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation, 
Insurance and Safety Act, be entitled to compensation for in-
juries received by him in the course of his employment, so 
here, under similar contractual conditions, the newsboy may 
not be held to be an employee of such publisher and entitled 
to the benefit arising from the provisions of the statute.'' 
4. There Must Be a Contract of Hire. 
Section .2 (-b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act says 
'' 'Employee' shall include every person, including a minor, in 
the service of another under any contract of hire or ap-
prenticeship, written or implied''. The California statute is 
very similar to the above. The Supreme Court of that state, 
in the case of State Compensatio'J~ Ins. Fu.nd v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., supra, says: 
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"We think it would be an unwarranted extension of this 
definition of an employee to hold that one who is not hired 
but w·ho simply purchases papers or other commodities of 
another for the purpose of reselling· them comes within the 
terms thereof.'' 
See also Cres~vell v. Charlotte NewH, etc., supra. In the in-
stant case Ifann purchased his papers from the defendant 
company and sold them in a territory previously assigned to 
him. He sold to all whom he could g·et to buy. He paid the 
company for the papers and the company looked to him, not 
to the customers, for payment. In the case of N. Y. Indemnity 
Co. v. Ind~tst1·ial Accident Cmnm. (Cal.), 1 Pac. (2nd) 12 
at 14, the court says : 
''Section 8 (a) of said act (Workmen's Compensation) pro-
vides: 'The term ''employee'' as used in sections six to thirty-
one, inclusive, of this act shall be construed to mean: Every 
person in the service of an employer as defined by section 
seven hereof under any appointment or contract of hire or 
apprenticeship express or implied, oral or written.' The 
undisputed evidence discloses that aside from the question 
of control the relation created by the daily series of contacts 
between Eustace and the newspaper publishers, through their 
leg·al representative, the district manager, while somewhat 
difficult of definition as that of an independent contractor, 
was more nearly allied to the relation of a sales agent, under 
the authorities to which we have been cited, than to that of 
an employee and employer as these terms are defined in the 
W orkmcn 's, etc., Act. See Piper v. Oakland Motor 0 o., 94 
"\Tt. 211, 109 A. 911; Poirer IJ!f.q. Co. v. Kitts, 18 N. D. 556, 
l 20 N. Yv. 558; Sinnett v. Watkins, 214 l{y. 76, 282 S. W. 
769. ,, 
In the same case, in 287 Pac. 368, the court, in discussing 
the s·ame section of their code, said: 
"It will be· noted that the relationship of employer and 
employee involves 'a contract of hire'. That the word 'hire' 
when used in connection with a contract employment, im-
plies that a reward or compensation shall be paid for the 
services performed is ind_icated in the case of M cCl~trskey v. 
Crom,u;ell, 11 N. Y. 593, 599; Carter-Mu,llahy Transfer Co. v. 
An.qell (Tex. Civ. App.), 181 S. W. 237, 238; Commonwealth 
v. Radoich~a, 205 Mass. 455, 91 N. E. 856." 
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Conversely, in the instant case, since there was no payment 
of wages, then there is no contract of hire. 
5. Payment of Wages. 
Sections 30, 31, 32 of the 'Vorkmen's Compensation Act 
provide for compensation for injuries at a rate determined 
by the "average weekly wages" and section 2 (c) of the act 
says ''Average weekly wages shall mean the earnings of the 
injured employee in the employment in which he was working 
at the time of the injury during the period of fifty-two weeks 
immediately preceding the date of the injury, divided by 
fifty-two". In order to receive compensation under the Act, 
Hann must be earning '' 'vages '' as defined in the act. 
As set out in the agreed statement of fact, I-Iann received 
papers from the Company sufficient to supply his route. 
These papers were charged to him and he settled for them 
at the end of the week. He sold these papers and made his 
own collections. If he was unable to collect from his cus-
tomers, Hann bore the risk of loss. Hann paid the defendant 
company, regardless of whether he collected for the papers, 
or not. His compensation was merely the profit, if any, which 
he received on the. transaction. He was not on the payroll of, 
nor did he receive any compensation from the defendant. 
''As far as concerns any compensation to be paid to the 
newsboy the contract here under consideration was to the 
effect that the newsboy would purchase from the publisher 
of the newspaper, and the latter would sell to the former, 
newspapers at a fixed price, and that if practicable the news-
boy would resell each of such newspapers, also at a prede-
termined price. The 'contract' contained no express stipu-
lation that for the 'services' to be performed by the news-
boy any reward or compensation as such would be paid to 
him. To the contrary, the re~vard, if any, to which the news-
boy n~ight beco·me entitled depencled, not upon the time dili-
gently expended by him in his elf orts to resell the newspa-
pers, but rather depended upon the profit which might be de-
rived fro'ln the sales actttally 'made." N. Y. Indemnity Co. v. 
l ndustrial, etc., 287 Pac. 368. 
To the same effect see Creswell v. Charlotte, etc., sttpra, and 
Birmingha;m Post Co. v. Sttt1·,qeon, S'ltpra. Such reward as 
H ann rece·ived was profit and not wages. And since compen-
sation under the act is based on ':vages, and Hann received 
no wages, he was not subject to the act. 
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SECOND. 
If the plaintiff was an ernplo;~;ee, was his injury "an injury 
by accide'l'tt arising out of and irt the co~trse of the ernploy-
ment''? 
In the agreed statement of fact it is stated that on the 
morning of July 17, 1934, Bartl am, a supervisor of carriers -
for the defendant company, called at the plaintiff's home to 
take hin1 to the sub-station where he got his papers and from 
which he carried them for distribution on his route. No 
transportation had previously been furnished and none was 
puromised under the contract between Hann and the defend-
ant company. Haun had previously furnished his own means 
of transportation, usually riding his bicycle. On the way to 
the sub-station the accident occurred, the automobile i·n which 
liann and Bartlam were riding being wrecked, and Hann was 
injured. Carriers were expected at the sub-station at 5:30 
A. l\L The accident happened at 5 :45 A. 1\L 
It is contended on behalf of the defendant company that 
this accident occurred and the injury was sustained within 
and under the ter1ns of the W orkma.n 's Compensation Act. 
The plaintiff !akes the position that 
1. The transportation was a mere gratuity. 
2. The transportation was ·not a part of the contract be-
tween Hann and the defendant company. 
3. The injury did not arise out of and in the course of the 
employment. (Sec. 2 d of Compensation Act.) 
''The words 'arising out of' and the words 'in the course 
of' are used conjunctively. In order to satisfy the statute 
both conditions must concur. It is not sufficient that the 
accident occur in the course of tire employment, but the causa-
tive danger must also arise out of it. The words 'arising out 
of' refer to the orig·in or cause of the accident and are de-
scriptive of its character, while the words 'in the course of' 
refer to the time,- place and circumstances under which the 
accident takes place. * * • By the use of these words it was 
not the -intention of the Legislature to make the employer 
an insurer· ag-ainst all accidental injuries which might happen 
to an employee while in the course of the employment, but 
for such injuries arising from or g·rowing out of the risks 
peculiar to the nature of the 'vork in the scope of· the work-
man's emnloyment or incidental to such employment, and 
Rccidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some 
risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special 
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degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all 
persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not trace-
able to some special degree to the particular employment are 
excluded." Dreyfus ct Co. v. Meade, 142 Va. 567, 129 S. E. 
336. 
''In the case quoted, a night watchman went across the 
street to a restaurant to get his lunch and was struck by an 
auto. The court further said ''His exposure to the hazards 
of the street at the time of the accident was not so connected 
with his employment, or with the perforn1ance of his ·work, 
as to make his presence on the street any part of the duty 
required of him by reason of his employment.'' 
In the case at bar, it was the duty of the plaintiff to pre-
sent himself at the sub-station and from that place to dis-
tribute newspapers. I-Iis employment did not begin until 
he arrived at the sub-station. He 'vas to select his own meth-
od of reaching that place. Neither his duties nor the con-
tract with the defendant company required him to ride in 
the automobile of the defendant. The risk of riding in an 
automobile was not incident to his duties of distributing 
newspapers. He could not have demanded transportation. 
The company would not have been liable if he had been in-
jured while riding to the sub-station on his bicycle. 
''Speaking generally, accidents on the streets are not com-
pensable as arising out of the employment.'' 28 R. C. L. 804. 
Also see Taylo·r v. Binswa;n,ger, 130 Va. 545. 
Riding in the automobile in question was not an incident to 
the employment as distributor of newspapers. 
''That an employee going to or from the place .where his 
work is to be performed is not engaged in performing any 
service growing out of and incidental to his employment.'' 
Kent v. Va. Car. Che1nical Co., 143 ·va. 62, 129 S. E. 330, cit-
ing Clapps Parking Station v. l'l~d. Acc'ts Com., 51 Cal. 624, 
197 Pac. 369. Also citing Bell's case, 238 Mass. 46, ·130 N. E. 
67. "His contract did not contemplate, nor was he, in fact, 
engaged in any service for his employer at that place. The 
risk from what he suffered was not a risk of his employ-
ment.'' 
Nor, ·while riding in the automobile, was Hann engaged in 
any service for his employer. (See citation above.) His 
service ~vould not begin until he reached the s11..b-station. To 
hold that the service began when Hann got into the automo-
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bile would be to say that there was a change in the contract. 
Hann did not so U'nderstand and if the defendant intended 
to make such a change, it was not c01nmunicated to Ifann. 
'l'heir 'minds did not 'Jneet on any change i1~ the contract. If 
there was no meeting of the 1ninds there was no change in 
the contract. Edichal Bullion Co. v. Columbia Gold Mining 
Co., 87 Va. 646, 13 S. E. 100. 
''As a general rule an injury suffered by an employee in · 
going to or returning from the employer's premises where 
the work of his employment is carried on does not arise out 
of his employment so as to entitle him to compensation un-
der 1Vorkmen 's Compensation Act.'' Nesbit v. Twin City F. 
& F. Co., 177 N. W. 131 (Minn.), 10 A. L. R. 165. 
It is sometimes claimed that there is an exception to this 
rule. 
''Upon this general rule some courts have ingrafted the 
following exception: \Vhen an employee is injured while 
riding to his place of work in a conveyance provided by the 
employer, 'after the real beg·inning of the employment, in 
cmnpliance with one of the express or implied terms of the 
contract of employment, for the mere use of the . employees, 
and is one which the employees are required, or, as a mat-
ter of right, are permitted, to use by virtue of that contract', 
. the injury may be held to have arisen out of and in the course 
of the employment.'' Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 
·N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 19150 778. 
In the case at bar there was no express contract of trans-
portation. A·ud it is agTeed that no transportation had ever 
been furnished before. Further, Hann was not permitted, 
as a matter of right, to ride in the automobile of the defend-
ant. Indeed, Bartlam could have refused to allow Hann to 
ride with him. So there was no implied contract which was 
the basis of ~xtending this transportation. If the transpor-
tation was not in conformity with a contract, then it was a 
gratuity. 
There does not seem to be any Virginia case directly in 
point with the facts of the case at bar. Below are given some 
decisions from other states which have similar facts to this 
case: 
Pie1·dil-uca v. Beneditto, 206 N. Y. 358. In this case a brick 
contractor has his men on a job but af 9 A. 1\-L they had to 
stop because of rain. At 11 A. 1\.L it stopped raining and in 
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order to get the job done quickly, the contractor got the brick-
layers in his car to carry them to work. No transportation 
had ever been previously furnished nor was it required un-
der the contract of employment. On the way to the job the 
car was in an accident and the plaintiff was injured. He 
brought suit and the defense was that the injury arose under 
the Compensation Act. The cou.rt held that the accident did 
not arise o·ut of and in the conrsc of the employment. 
Gruber v. Mercy, 145 Atl. 106 (N. J.). Miss Gruber was 
going to work. vVithout prior arrangement or without any 
understanding arising out of the terms of her employment, 
her employer invited her and a companion to get into his 
car, saying "he would take them down". On the way an 
accident occurred and the plaintiff was injured. She sued 
and obtained a verdict. The employer appealed, claiming 
that the case should have been tried under the \Vorkman 's 
Compensation Act. The court held that the act of the em-
ployer was simply a courtesy, wholly disconnected from the 
relation of master and servant and that the injury did not 
''arise out of and in the course of'' the employment. 
Boutte v. R. L. Roland, 132 So. 398 (La.). The plaintiff, 
a bricklay~r, 'vas picked up at his home by the foreman of 
the defendant, to be taken in the foreman's car to the place 
where the work was to be done. The foreman had the power 
to hire and fire, but did not have authority to promise trans-. 
portation as a part of the contract of employment. On the 
way to the place where the work was to be done, an acci-
dent occurred and the plaintiff was injured. He claimed 
compensation under the Workman's Compensation Act. ·The 
court heid that transportation was not a part of the contract 
of employment, but a mere gratuity and compensation 'vas 
refused. It was also held that the accident did not arise out 
of or in the course of the employment, the risk not being 
greater than that· to which the p~tblic was exposed. 
Bhegart, et al., v. Indttstrial Con~mission, 168 N. E. 288 
(Ill.). Plaintiff claimed that he had been told to get in a 
truck of the defendant and go to the place where the work 
was to be done. This was the first day of his employment. 
On the trip the truck was struck by a train. He claimed 
compensation under the act. The court said : ''In this case, 
even though it be said that the commission were justified in 
finding that Kraft had been employed by Funk and Gries-
baum, there is no evidence that he had reached the place of 
employment at the time of his injury, and the circuit court 
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was therefore rig-ht, in setting· aside the award. * * * The 
first question involved is whether the injuries arose ont of 
and in the course of the employn1ent of the plaintiff in error. 
* • * The general rule is that e1nploy·ment does not begin until 
the employee reaches the place ~vhere he is to work or the scene 
of his duties and does not continue after he has left." 
Industrial Con~tnission of Ohio v. llall, 176 N. E. 458, 
(Ohio). Heil was superintendent of the defendant's plant 
two miles fron1 Springfield. Heil lived in Springfield. He 
drew a salary of $40.00 per w·eek and was allowed the cost 
of transportation from his home to the plant, not to exceed 
$5.00 per week. On the day of the accident he got a cab to 
take hilu to the plant, but got out of the cab about two blocks 
from the plant to walk the rest of the way. While walking 
he was struck by an automobile. He claimed that he was 
in the cour.se of the employment from the time he got into 
the cab because the transportation was furnished by the com-
pany. The court said: '' Ife could not possibly do any of 
the things he was employed to do until he reached the plant 
itself. That is where his duties began in the morning, and 
where they ended in the evening after he had finished his 
day's services.'' The claim was denied. 
8chult.z v. Champion Welding & J.l!fg. Co., 130 N. E. 304, 
(N. Y.). A foreman of a shop took his employer's car, as 
he was authorized to do, to go to sec about an outside job, 
and after his day's work drove the car home as he was per-
mitted to do. It was held that an injury which occurred the 
followrng morning, while he was driving to the employer's 
place of business, did not arise out of and in the course of 
his employment, the court stating that the risk involved in 
'ltsin,q the car to .ao to the place where he ~vas e1nployed ~vas 
no m.ore a risk of the b·nsiness of the employer than it would 
have been had he walked. 
~~ eade Bros. v. State Industrial Commission, 291 Pac. 571 
(Okla.). In this case the claimant was a fireman for the de-
fendant. He lived in Stillwater, Okla., and worked several 
miles from that place. On the day in question he was rid-
inu· to work in a car belonging to the driller, and about six 
miles froiQ the location of the 'vork the car turned over, 
and the clain1a'nt "ras hurt. There was a claim that there 
was an implied contract to furnish transportation which was 
reached from the facts, that the place of work was a great 
rlistancr from available living quarters; that it was the cus-
tom of this driller to haul the other employees to the well; 
14 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
and that the company would not employ a driller unless he 
had a car. The court said: "This court is not willing to 
say that the employrnent of a laborer imposes upon the em-
ployer any respo·nsibility for the safety of that laborer in 
going to and from the place of work, in the absence of a spe-
cific or implied agTeement for transportation, or that such 
agreement will he implied fron1 the facts" given above. 
Below are given two decisions of the Industrial Commis-
sion of Virginia on similar cases : 
Leache v. Paul Knitting IJ!ills, 7 0. I. C. 599. The com-
pany had employed an expert to lecture to the employees 
and required them to attend on their time (employees) and 
without pay. Leache asked to be excused from attending·, 
but his request was refused. That evening the superintend-
ent was on his way, in his automobile, to pick up certain em-
ployees to take them to the lecture. He saw Leache standing 
on the corner and called to him to find out if he was going 
to the lecture. Leac11e replied that he was and got into the 
car.· An accident occurred and Leache was injured. The 
Commission held: ''While it may be said that the accident 
did arise out of the employment, the Commissioner does not 
believe that it arose in the course of it.'' The case was dis-
missed. 
Battle v. TT a. Ry. ce Power Co., 7 0. I. C. 631. Claimant 
was a section man. He was given a badge entitling him to 
ride on the cars of the company free He was supposed to 
get to work at 7 A. M. He was not paia for the time con-
sumed in going to and from work. On the morning in ques-
tion he attempted to board a car at 6:30 .l\.. M. to go to work. 
He slipped, fell and injured himself. The claim was refused 
for the following reasons: 
1. The claimant's employment did not expose him in any 
unusual degree to the hazards of the street in any manner. 
He simply had to go to his work, as do thousands of other 
people engaged hi all kinds of different occupations each day. 
He did not even have to ride upon the street car if he chose 
not to, if this could be said an unusual hazard. 
2. That the transportation was no part of the contract of 
employment. 
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CONCLUSION. 
FIRST. 
liVas the plaintiff an entplo11ee of the defendant compa;ny? 
1. To constitute the relation of employer and employee, the 
employer must have complete control of the employee. In this 
case, such control as was exercised, was control of the result 
and not of the means and n1ethods of obtaining the result. 
2. Supervision does not destroy or impair the existence of 
the re1ation of independent contractor. 
3. The right to discharge was not present in this case. 
At most the defendant company could only refuse to sell 
Hann any more papers. 
4. There was no contract of hire. 
5. There was no payment of wages. Hann's only com-
pensation was the profit, if any, from the sale of papers. He 
received neither salary nor con1nrission from the defendant 
company. 
The relation was that of an independent contractor, or that 
of b11,yer and seller of goods. · 
SECOND. 
lf the plai"ntiff ·was an employee, U'as he injured by accident 
arisinlJ out of and in the cou.rse of the e1nployn1,ent? 
1. The accident happened before Hann reached the place 
at which his services began, and consequently did not arise 
out of and during the course of the employment. 
2. Ha~1n was not eng·aged jn any service for the defendant 
company. 
3. Transportation 'vas not furnished in accordance with 
any contract, express or implied, hence was a mere gratuity. 
4. The contract for the delivery of papers did not con-
template exposure to the risks of riding in an automobile. 
5. There was no meeting of the minds 9n any change in the 
contract between Hann and the defendant company, which 
may be relied upon by the defendant company as operating 
to place the accident 'vithin the course of and arising out of 
the employment. 
The plaintiff, for the reasons assigned, prays that to the 
judp:ment aforesaid a writ of error be awarded; that if either 
of the assignments be well taken, the judgment of the Trial 
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Court be reversed and the case re1nanded for trial of the 
issues raised by the Notice of 1vl otion for Judgment herein, 
and that such other relief be afforded as to this court seems 
proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL H. HANN, 
An infant who sues by Sarah A. Hann, 
his next friend. 
By T. DIX SUTTON, Counsel. 
We, Louis S. Herrink and F. A. Roscher, attorneys prac-
ticing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do here-
by certify that in our opinion there is error in the judgment 
complained of in the foregoing petition, and that the same 
should be reviewed and reversed. 
Received April 30, 1935. 
LOUIS S. HE.RRINJ7 
F. A. ROSCHER. 
~L B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error granted ~fay 28, 1935. Bond $300.00. 
E. W. HUDGINS. 




Pleas before the Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge 
. of the Law and Equity Court of the ·City of -Richmond, 
Part Two, held for the said City at the Court thereof in 
the City Hall on the 3oth da.y of November, 1934. 
Be It Remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Offi'Ce of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two·, the 1st day of September, 1934: Came Earl H. 
Hann, an infant, who sues by Sarah A. Hann, his next friend, 
hy counsel, and filed his Notice of Motion for Judgment 
against Times-Dispatch Publishing ·C'ompany, Incorporated, 
and Raymond Bartlam, which Notice of ~Iotion for Judgment 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
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page 2 ~ In the Law and Equity Court Part II of the City 
of Richmond; 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
Earl H. Hann, an infant who sues by Sarah A. Hann, his next 
friend, 
v. 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and Ray-
mond Bartlam. 
NOTICE. 
'ro Times-Dispatch Publishing· Company, Incorporated, 107 
South Seventh Street, Richmond, Virginia, and Raymond 
Bartlam, 203 Minor Street, Richmond, Virginia. 
You and each of you are hereby notified that on the 17th 
of September, 1934, at 10 A. M. or as soon ·thereafter as 
Counsel may be heard, I shall move the Law and Equity Court 
Part II of the City of Richmond, Virginia, at its court room 
in Richmond, .Virginia, for a judgment against you, the said 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, a cor-
poration chartered under the la-ws of the State of Virginia, 
and Raymond Bartlam, defendants herein, jointly and sev-
erally, for the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, 
which sum is justly due and owing to me, the said plaintiff 
herein, by you, and each of you, the said defendants, by reason 
of the following facts: 
That before and at the time of the committing of the griev-
ances hereinafter mentioned, you, the said Raymond Bartlam, 
one of the defendants herein, were employed in the circulation 
department of the Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, In-
corporated, as a supervisor. That in performance of your 
duties as such supervisor, you were, on the 17th day of July, 
1934, operating a certa.in Ford automobile over and along the 
streets of the City of Richmond, Virginia, and at about 5:45 
A. M. on that date you offered to give me a ride from my 
home at 508 S. Sheppard Street, in the City of Richmond, 
to a point on Shields Avenue. At your special in-
page 3 }- stance and request, I, the said plaintiff, became and 
was a passenger in said automobile operated by 
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you as aforesaid. And you, the said Raymond Bartlam, did 
then and there receive me as such passenger, and thereupon 
it became and 'vas your duty to use. proper care that I should 
be safely carried in said automobile operated by you. 
Yet you, the said Raymond Ba.rtlam, not regarding your 
duty in that behalf, did not use due and proper care that I, 
the said plaintiff, should be safely carried by your said a.uto-
Inobile, but wholly neglected so to do, and ran the said auto-
mobile carelessly and negligent:ly, without keeping a proper 
lookout, at an excessive rate of speed and ·without properly 
adjusted brakes and other equipment, by reason of which acts 
of gross carelessness and negligence on your part, you, while 
driving said automobile eastwardly out of Byrd Park and 
turning northwardly into Davis Avenue, ran said automobile 
over the curb on Davis A venue and into a. tree thereon, sud-
denly and with great force and violence. 
That you, the said Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, 
Incorporated, were, on the 17th day of July, 1934, through 
one of your agents, servants and employees, operating a 
certain Ford Autpmobile over and along the streets of the 
City of Richmond, Virginia, and at about 5 :45 A. M. on that 
date you, through your agent, servant and emp]oyee, who was 
at that time acting within the scope of his employment and 
on your behalf, offered to give me a ride from my home at 
508 S. Sheppard Street, in the City of Richmond, to a point 
on Shields· A venue. At your special instance and request, 
through your agent, servant and employee, I became and was 
a passenger in said automobile operated by you through your 
agent, servant and employee as aforesaid. And you, the said 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, did then 
and there receive me as such passenger, and thereupon it be-
came and was your duty, through your servant, agent and em-
ployee, to drive and operate and to cause to be driven and 
operated said automobile in a proper manner so that 
page 4 ·~ I might be safely carried therein. 
Yet, notwithstanding your duty, you, the said 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, through 
your agent, servant or employee, did drive and cause to be 
driven, said automobile carelessly and negligently, at a high 
tl.nd excessive rate of speed, 'vithout a proper lookout, with 
improperly adjusted brakes and equipment not in good re-
pair .and condition; and did fail to obey all rules, regulations, 
ordinances and laws then and there a.pplica.ble to vehicular 
traffic. By reason of said acts of gross negligence, you, the 
-said Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, did, 
through your agent, servant or employe, drive or cause to be 
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driven, said automobile in Byrd Park in an easterly direction 
and tun1 north into Davis Avenue, and upon the 'curb and 
into a tree on said Davis Avenue, suddenly and with great 
force and violence. 
By reason of the sudden and immediate impact with said 
tree, and without any fault on my part, and while I was in my 
seat, where I had a right to be, I was thrown from my said 
seat with great force and violence, which caused me to suffer 
hitherto great mental anguish and physical pain, bruises, 
lacerations, contusions, the loss of two teeth and injuries 
to others and permanent scars causing disfigurement to my 
face. By reason of all which I have incurred and continue 
to incur great monetary obligations in and about endeavor-
ing to be relieved and cured of said injuries. 
Therefore, I, Earl H. Hann, an infant, through Sarah A. 
Hann, my next friend, give notice to each of the said defend-
ants of this motion for judgment against you and each of you, 
jointly and severally for the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,-
000.00) Dollars. 
EARL H. HANN, 
An infant who sues by Sarah A. Hann, 
his next friend. 
By T. DIX S1JTTON, 
Counsel. 
page 5 } And at another day, to-wit: at a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
17th day of Septetnber, 1934. 
This day came the plaintiff, by counsel, and on his motion it 
is ordered that this case be docketed and continued. 
page 6 } And at another day, to-wit: at a Law and Equity 
Court of the 1City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
22nd day of September, 1934. · 
This day came again the plaintiff and the defendant, Times-
Dispatch Publishing Company, by counsel, and it appearing 
to the Court that upon the 17th day of September, 1934, the 
defendant Times-Dispatch Publishing Company tendered to 
the Court its Plea in Abatement No. 1, and that at that time 
no order was entered in reference to said plea; it is now or-
dered that the said Plea in Abatement No. 1 be filed nunc 
pro tunc as of the 17th day of September, 1934; to the filing 
of which plea the plaintiff, by counsel, excepted. 
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page 7 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT #1. 
Earl H. Hann, an infant who sues by Sarah A. Hann, his 
next friend, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Times-Dis-patch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and Ray-· 
mond Bartlam, Defendants. 
The said defendant, Times-Dispatch Publishing Company," 
I:rrcorporated, by its agent comes and says that the Court ought 
not to have or take any further cognizance of the action afore-
said of the said plaintiff, because it says that before and at. 
the time it is alleged that the grievances in: the notice of motion· 
were committed, the plaintiff, Earl H. Hann, was an employee· 
of the said Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incor-
porated, a corporation organized under the la,vs of the State 
of Virginia and doing business in the said State, and an 
"employer" in said State within the meaning of a certain 
Act of the General Assembly of Virginia, known as ''The 
Workmen's Compensation Act", and the plaintiff was an 
''employee'' of the said Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, 
Incorporated, within the· meaning of s·aid Act; that the said· 
Act provides that the sole jurisdiction of causes cognizable 
by it, of which this is one, is v-ested in the Industrial Com-
mission of the Commonwealth of Virginia, which said pro-
vision takes from Circuit and Corporation Courts their com-
mon law jurisdiction in causes cognizable under the Work-
Inen 's Compensation Act; that this is a. cause cognizable under 
· the Workmen's Compensation Act and hence the 
page 8 ~ Industrial Conunission alone has jurisdiction in this 
matter as concerns the said defendant, Times-Dis-
patch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and the said plain-
tjff, Earl H. Harm. And this the defendant is ready to 
~ill~ -
Wherefore, it prays judgment whether this Court can or 
will take any further cognizance of the action aforesaid. 
TIMES-DISP ATOH PUBLISHING 
COMPANY, INC., 
By BENJA~1IN R. BRUNER, 
its agent. 
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page 9 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Renee M. Sarti., 
a Notary Public in and for the State and City aforesaid, 
Bentiamin R. Bruner, and gave oath that the matters stated 
in the foregoing plea are true. 
Given under my hand this 18th day of September, 1934. 
RENEE M. SARTI, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires October 9, 1937. 
page 10 ~ And on the same day, to-wit: at a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, 
held the 22nd day of September, 1934. 
This day came again the plaintiff and the defendant, Times-
Dispatch Publishing Company, by counsel, and by leave of 
court filed herein its Plea in Abatement No. 2; to the filing 
of which plea the plaintiff, by counsel, excepted. 
page 11 r Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT #2. 
Earl H. Hann, an infant who sues by Sarah A. Hann, his 
next friend, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and Ray-
mond Bartlam, Defendant. 
The said defendant, Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, 
Incorporated, by its agent comes a.nd says that the Court 
ought not to have or take any further cognizance of the 
action aforesaid of the said plaintiff, because it says that 
before and at the time it is alleged that the grievances in the 
notice of motion were committed, the plaintiff, Earl H. Hann, 
was an employee of the said Times-Dispateh Publishing Com-
pany, Incorporated, a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of .Virginia and doing business in the said State, 
and an ''employer'' in said State within the meaning of a 
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certain Act of the General Assembly of Virginia, known as 
"The Workmen's Compensation Act'', and the plaintiff was 
an ''employee" of the said Times-Dispatch Publishing Com-
pany, Incorporated, within the meaning of said Act; that the 
- said Act provides that the sole jurisdiction of causes cog-
nizable by it, of which this is one, is vested in the Industrial 
Commission of the Commonwealth of Virginia, which said. 
provision takes from Circuit and Corporation Courts their 
common la\v jurisdiction in causes cognizable 
page 12 ~ under the Workmen's Compensation Act; that 
· this is a cause cognizable under the Work-
mep 's Compensation Act, and hence the Industrial 
Con1mission alone has jurisdiction in this matter as 
concerns the said d~fenda.nt, Times-Dispatch Company, In-
corporated, and the said plaintiff, Earl H. Hann; that the 
defendant and the plaintiff are both bound by the said terms· 
and provisions of the said Worlrmen 's Compensation Act. 
And the said defendant says that heretofore, to-wit, on 
the 20th day of September, 1934, after the commission of the 
said grievances in the notice· of motion mentioned, the Indus-
trial Commission of Virginia, under the provisions of the Act 
of the Assembly aforesaid made an award dismissing the 
claim of the plaintiff, as claimant, against the said defendant, 
and that a notice has been given by the defendant for a review 
of the said award, on September 21st, 1934, and that the cause,· 
under the provisions of the said W orlrmen 's Compensation 
Act, ·is now pending before the said Industrial Commission 
upon a review before the Full Commission to the award above 
mentioned. 
And the defendant further says that the said plaintiff is, 
by virtue of the terms of the Act of Assembly aforesaid, 
barred from. prosecuting any suit for the alleged cause of 
action in the notice of motion mentioned. A.nd this the de-
fendant is ready to verify. . 
Wherefore, it pra.ys judgment 'vhether this Court can or 
will take any further cognizance of the action aforesaid. 
TI~fES-DISPATCH PUBLISHING 
COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
By BENJAMIN R. BRUNER, . 
its agent and Attorney. 
State of Virginia, 
: City of. Richmond, to-wit: 
This· day personally appeared before me, Renee M. Sarti ~-Notary Public in and for the Sta.te and City aforesaid, Ben: 
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jamin R. Bruner, and gave oath that the n1atters stated in 
the foregoing plea are true. 
Given under my hand this 22 day of September, 1934. 
RENEE M. SARTI, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Oct. 9, 19,37. 
page 13 ~ And at another day, to-wit: at a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, )leld- the 
28th day of September, 1934. 
This day came the plaintiff, by counsel, and filed herein his 
replication in writing to the two pleas in abatement here-
tofore filed by the defendant, Times-Dispatch PublishiDlg Com-
pany. 
page 14 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court Part II of the City of 
Richmond. 
Earl H. Hann, an infant who sues by Sarah A. Hann, his 
next friend, Plaintiff, 
'V. 
•:rimes-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and Ray-
mond Bartlam, Defendants. 
REPLICATION. 
The said plaintiff, by his attorney, comes and says tha.t 
notwithstanding anything by the said defendant in his two 
pleas alleged, this court ought not to be precluded from taking 
further cognizance of this action, because, he says, the cause 
of action in the notice of motion in this action mentioned did 
not arise under the Workman's Compensation Act a.n:d is not 
within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, but the 
said cause of action is properly cognizable by this ·Court. 
And this the said plaintiff prays may be inquired of by 
tl1e country. 
SARAH A. HANN, 
next friend of Earl H. Hann, an infant. 
By T. DIX SUTTON, p. q. 
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page 15 ~ And now at this day, to-wit: at a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
30th day of November, 1934. . 
This day came again the plaintiff and the defendant, Times-
Dispatch· ·Publishing Company, by counsel, and none of the 
parties demanding a jury for the trial of this case upon the 
issues raised by the pleas in abatement, but agreeing that 
all matters of la\v and fact might be heard and determined 
and judgment r·endered by the Court, and the evidence and 
arguments of counsel being heard, and an agreed statement 
of facts now being filed, the Court is of opinion that it has no 
jurisdiction over the subject matter arising upon the phlin-
tiff's Notice of Motion for Judgment, and therefore the plain-
tiff's action cannot be sustained. • · 
Therefore it is considered by the Court that the said pleas 
in abatement be sustained, and that the plaintiff take nothing 
by his bill but that the defendant, Times-Dispatch Publishing 
Company go thereof without day and recover against the 
plaintiff its costs by it about its suit in this behalf expended; 
to which ruling and judgment of the Court the plaintiff, by 
counsel, excepted. 
page 16 }-AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Earl H. Hann, an infant Vt·ho sues by Sarah A. Hann, his next 
friend, 
v .. 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and Ray-
mond Bartlam. 
Earl Hann had an oral agreement with the Times-Dispatch 
Publishing Company, Incorporated, to deliver papers of the 
said Company each morning. The Company has various 
.sub-stations to which its papers are delivered and then given 
to the carriers for distribution. One of these sub-stations is 
located at 310 S. Shields A venue in the City of Richmond, 
Virginia. Hann, together with forty-six other carriers, was 
under the supervision of Raymond L. B.artlam, who has the 
power to enter into and cancel agreements with these various 
carriers. · It is the duty of the carriers to arrive a.t this station 
at 5 :30 in the morning and receive their papers and thence go 
on their route. Sufficient papers are furnished by the com-
pany to· each carrier to serve his route. The route is desig-
nated by the Times-Dispatch and the carrier cannot deviate 
therefrom. The list of customers is the property of the Times-
Dispatch Publishing Company. Additional customers could 
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be secured by the ca.rrier on the route designated. At the 
end of each week the carrier collected for the papers which 
he had delivered and paid the Company for the papers de-
livered to him. Any loss sustained by reason of the carrier 
being unable to collect from the Ctlstomer must be borne by 
the carrier. Hann used a bicycle which was his own prop-
erty in delivering his papers, and in going to and from the 
sub-station~ but he did not use it on the day of the injury. 
Bartlam is required to be present and see that the papers 
are properly distributed among the carriers. He owns an 
automobile personally and is given an allowance by the Times-
Dispatch Publishing Company, as he uses the car in their 
business. On the 17th day of July, 1934, Bartlam arrived 
at the sub-station about 4:45 A~ M., and after getting the 
papers sorted out for the different carriers, he dis-
page 17 } tributed them to those carriers who were present. 
A few minutes after 5 :30 A. M., Earl Hann and 
One Chambers had not shown up, and Bartlam started out in. 
his car after then1. He picked up Chambers' (who lives near 
Hann) on the street, as Chambers was on his way to the sub-, 
station. fie then drove by Hann 's home on south Sheppard 
Street and picked him up. He proceeded from Hann 's house, 
south on Sheppard Street, turned east through Byrd Park 
to Davis Avenue and in making the turn into Davis Avenue, 
from the Park, at the intersection of Lakeview A venue, the 
accident out of which these injuries arose occurred. This was 
the most direct route from the injured's home to the sub-
station where the papers were located. The aecident occurred 
a.t 5 :45 A. M. 
Bartlam was accustomed to going after his carrier whenever 
they were late because of siclo1ess or ov-ersleeping or for 
any other reason, and he usually had one or two to go for 
each day. This custom was not known to Hann. The super-
visor had never furnished Hann with transportation to the 
sub-station before. 
Hann has filed a notice of motion for judgment against 
the Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated and 
Raymond Bartlam in the La 'v and Equity Court, Part IT, 
of the City of Richmond and the Times-Dispatch Publishing 
Company, Incorporated, has asked that the Industrial Com-
mission of Virginia enter an a'vard, which proceeding is 
now pending before the Commission on a motion of the Times-
Dispatch· Publishing Company, Incorporated, to review. 
Hann had no control whatsoever as to the operation of the 
car in which he was riding at the time of the injury. There 
was no express agreement to furnish transportation in the 
contract of employment. The Times-Dispatch regulations re-
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quired that the carriers complete the delivery on their routes· 
by 7:00 A.. ~L, but there is no agreement that this was always·. 
complied with. 
page 18 ~ And on the same day, to-wit: at a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
30th day of November, 1934. 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the plain-
tiff tendered to the Court his Certificate of Evidence, a.nd on 
the request of the said plaintiff the said Certificate of Evi-
dence is signed and made. a part of the record in this case. 
/ page 19 ~ Virginia : 
In the La-w and Equity Court Pa.rt II of the City of 
Richmond. 
Earl H. Hann, an infa.nt who sues· by Sarah A. Hann, his 
next friend, 
v. 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, and Ray-
mond Bartlam. 
The following is an agreed statement of fact with a supple-
mental statement thereto, constituting all of the evidence that 
was introduced on the trial of the issue of the plea in aba.te-
ment to the jurisdiction of this court : 
''Earl Ha.nn had a.n oral agreement with the Times-Dis-
patch Publishing Company, Incorporated, to deliver papers 
of the said Company each morning. The Company has 
various sub-stations to which its papers are delivered and 
then given to the carriers for distribution. One of these 
sub-stations is located a.t 310 S. Shields A venue in· the City 
of Richmond, Virginia. IIann, together with forty-six other 
carriers, was under the supervision of Raymond L. B.a.rtlam, 
who has the power to enter into and cancel agreements with 
these various carriers. It is the duty of the carriers to 
arrive at this station at 5 :30 inl the morning and receive 
their papers and thence go on their routes. Sufficient papers· 
are furnished by the Company to each carrier to serve his 
route. The route is designated ·by the Times:-Dispatch and 
the carrier cannot deviate therefrom. The list of customers 
is the property of the Times-Dispatch Publishing Company . 
. Additional ~ustomers could be secured by the carrier on the 
route designated. At the end of each week the carrier col-· 
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lec~d for the papers 'vhich he had delivered ·and paid the 
Company for the papers delivered to him. Any loss sustained 
by reason of the carrier being unaQle to collect from the cus-
tomer must be borne· by the carrier. Hann used a bicycle 
'\\7hich was his own property in delivering his papers, and in 
going to a.nd from the sub-station, but he did not use it on 
the day of the injury. 
Bartlam is ·required to be present a.nd see that 
page 20 ~ the papers are prope.rly distributed among the 
.. carriers. He owns an automobile personally and is 
given an allowance by the Times-Dis·patch Company, as he 
uses the car in their business. On the 17th day of July, 1934, 
Bartlam arrived at the sub-station about 4:45 A. M., and after 
getting the papers sorted out for the different carriers, he 
distributed them to those carriers who were present. A few 
minutes after 5 :30 A. M., Earl Ha.nn and· one Chambers had 
not shown up, and Bartlam started out in his car after them. 
He picked up Chambers (who lives near Hann) on the street, 
as Chambers 'vas on his way to the sub-station. He then drove 
by Hann 's home on south Sheppard Street and picked him 
up. He proceeded from I-Ia.nn 's house, south on Sheppard · 
Street, turned east through Byrd Park to Davis A venue and 
in making the turn into Davis A venue, from the Park, at the 
intersection of Lakeview Avenue, the accident out -of which 
these injuries arose occurred. This was the most direct 
route from the injured's home· to the sub-station where the 
papers were located. The accident occurred at 5 :45 A. M. 
Bartlam was accustomed to going after his carriers when-
ever they were late because of sickness or oversleeping or 
for any other reason, and he usually had one or two to go for 
each day. This custom was not known to Harm. The super-
visor had never furnished Harm with transportation to the 
Rub-station before. 
Hanu has filed a notice of motion for judgment against the 
Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated and Ray-
mond Bartlam in the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the 
City of Richmond and -the Times-Dispatch Publishing Com-
pan~, Incorporated, has asked that the Industrial Commis-
sion of Virginia enter an award, which proceeding is now 
pending before the Commission on a motion of the Times-
Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, to review. 
Hann had no control whatsoever as to the operation of the 
car in which he was riding at the time of the injury. 
There was no express agreement to furnish transportation 
in the contract of employment. 
page 21 r The Times-Dispatch regulations required that 
the -carriers complete the delivery of their routes 
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by 7 A. M., but there is· no agreement. that this was always 
complied with.'' 
SUPPLE~IENTAL FACTS. 
''The Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, 
is subject to the provisions of the Yv orkmen 's Compensation 
Act and neither the company nor Hann have given notice 
that they would not be subject to the act. 
The Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, 
withdrew its motion for review of the proceedings before the 
Industrial Con1mission of Virginia, on the 8th day of Novem-
ller, 1934. '' 
Teste: this 30th day of November, 1934, after due written 
notice to the Times-Dispatch Publishing Co., Inc. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR., Judge. 
page 22 ~ I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the 
record in the above entitled case wherein Earl H. Ha.nn, an 
infant, who sues by Sarah A. Hann, his next friend, is plain-
tiff, and Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated, 
and Raymond Bartl am, are defendants, and that· the defen'd-
ant, Times-Dispatch Publishing Company, Incorporated had 
due notice of the intention of the plaintiff to apply for such 
transcript. 
Witness my hand this 17th day of January, 1935. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for Record $8.25. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M: B. WATTS, C. C. 
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